Don't confuse them with facts
By Yossi Melman
Haaretz, December 31, 2003
Libya surprised the world with heartening news, the eastern front has disappeared and the threat to Israel has shrunk. So why aren't the shapers of security policy and the political echelon celebrating the change?
Ahistorical strategic decision - this is how commentators, experts and leaders throughout the world have been defining Libya's announcement last Friday that it would divest itself of its weapons of mass destruction and limit the range of its missiles. This is the first time that a state in the Middle East has decided of its own free will to destroy, under international supervision, its stock of chemical and biological weapons and has announced that it will stop developing nuclear arms.
The way in which the world was informed of the Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi's decision was also surprising. For nine months, secret contacts went on between senior officials in the American intelligence community, Britain and Libya - and not a whisper was leaked to the media anywhere in the world.
These contacts began in March, a short time before the United States went to war in Iraq, when Moussa Koussa, the head of Libya's foreign intelligence branch, traveled in secret to London and held talks with the senior officials of MI-6, Britain's foreign intelligence organization. From then on, systematically, the MI-6 officials were joined by counterparts from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and met in Tripoli for talks about disarming Libya of its stocks of unconventional weapons.
In the discussions, the Britons and the Americans met for talks into the wee hours with Muammar Gadhafi himself. Experts on chemical, biological and atomic weaponry from Britain and the United States were allowed to visit 10 sites in different parts of Libya. And all this was kept from the eyes of the media. "That we, the journalists, have failed, is very painful," admits a senior editor at The New York Times. "We didn't know and we didn't sense that the deal was cooking, even when there were already signs of the emerging change in Gadhafi's approach."
The signs of the change were Libya's agreement to admit responsibility for the terrorist attack on the Pan Am plane 15 years ago over the town of Lockerbie in Scotland; to hand over the two intelligence agents who were responsible for the terror operation to stand trial in a Scottish court in The Hague; and, four months ago, its announcement that it would pay $10 million to every family that lost one of its members in the explosion of the airplane.
Even more problematic than the fog that surrounded the international media was the failure of Israeli intelligence, which did not realize that something important was happening among Gadhafi, U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. "We hardly knew about these contacts, and if we did know, we mistakenly believed that they had to do with the matter of the compensation," admitted one senior Israeli intelligence official. "Our lack of knowledge is embarrassing for two reasons. First of all, because our American allies compartmentalized us entirely, and secondly, because Libya is not terra incognita for us."
Spying on Libya
Even though Libya is not among the countries of the first circle in the Israeli-Arab conflict, it has always been perceived as a strategic threat "beyond the horizon" and therefore served as a target for intelligence gathering. The failure to assess Gadhafi's recent turnaround correctly is magnified because, according to foreign reports, Israeli intelligence has conducted quite a few information-gathering operations against Libya - even within its territory.
Victor Ostrovsky, in his first book, "By Way of Deception," tells about operations of Mossad agents inside Libya, with the help of Israel Defense Forces special operations units and navy ships. Among other things, he mentions the sinking of Palestinian Liberation Organization weapons ships in the port of Tripoli, the enlisting of agents and the planting of eavesdropping equipment.
It is also possible to learn about Israeli actions against Libya from the interception by the Israeli Air Force of a Syrian plane flying over Syria in February, 1986. Israeli intelligence believed, mistakenly, that on the plane were senior officials of Palestinian terror organizations who had participated in a "terror summit" in Libya. In October 1995, Mossad agents assassinated Fathi Shkaki, the head of Islamic Jihad, when he arrived in Valetta, the capital of Malta, on a ferry from Libya. For these actions and others, it was necessary to have high quality and precise intelligence. The surprising statement by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon over a year ago, that Libya is engaged in the development of nuclear weapons and could even succeed at it before Iran, showed that Israeli intelligence takes an interest in what is happening in Libya and knows what is going on there.
There are several reasons for this interest, among them Gadhafi's support for the Palestinian terror organizations (Abu Nidal's group, for example, was under Libya's patronage during the 1980s). Libyan intelligence provided the terror organizations with documentation and weapons, helped them smuggle materiel through the diplomatic mail and allowed Palestinian terrorists to train on its territory. A number of naval terror operations against Israel, some of which were thwarted out at sea, began in Libya.
An equally important reason for the interest Israel has taken in Libya was Gadhafi's efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, it turns out that Libya, as it admitted in the contacts with the representatives of the West, has a stock of 100 tons of mustard gas, bacterial and germ cultures and the ability to fashion bombs and arm missile warheads with chemical weapons. To these must be added a nuclear research reactor, an installation to enrich uranium and attempts to increase the range of Scud missiles to 1,000 kilometers, so that in the future they could also hit Israeli territory.
Libya's dramatic step joins two more events with strategic implications that are shaping the balance of power in the Middle East. These are the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, accompanied by the breakup of the Iraqi army, and Iran's agreement to sign the additional protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This agreement will enable inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to hold invasive and unannounced inspections of all nuclear sites. All the experts agree that Iran will now find it very difficult to produce fissionable materials in secret, and in effect, its ability to obtain nuclear weapons is "suspended."
"Indeed, there is not a shadow of doubt that the magnitude of the threats to Israel has decreased," says Dr. Shai Feldman, head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. He says that there is enormous significance to the events in these three places - Iraq, Iran and Libya. From the lineup of forces threatening Israel, an entire army has been eliminated - Iraq's, with its hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and thousands of tanks, artillery pieces and missiles, even if they were not the newest in the world. Thus, in effect what Israel has called "the eastern front" has collapsed. "It could be said that a significant conventional threat has been removed," notes Feldman.
Libya's decision to divest itself of its weapons contributes to two additional strategic insights: There has been a considerable weakening of the radical front (Libya, Iraq and Iran), which fanned the Arab struggle against Israel with its rhetoric and backed it with diplomacy.
Above all, the moment Libya begins - within a few months - to destroy its chemical and biological weapons and limit the range of its missiles to 300 kilometers, there will remain only one state - Syria - that will have the ability, though small, to hit Israel with missiles and chemical weapons, at least theoretically (since Egypt has signed a peace agreement with Israel and has not been uttering threats to use its armaments against it). But it is difficult to see Syria as a real threat to Israel, and certainly not as an existential threat. Its economy is shaky, its weapons systems are obsolete (it doesn't have the budget to renew and improve its army) and it is afraid of the long arm of the United States, because it gives patronage to terror organizations like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, coordinates actions with Hezbollah and allows the infiltration of Al-Qaida activists into Iraqi territory.
Not facing reality
Israel might have been expected to greet the Libyan move enthusiastically. Even the biggest sourpusses and the sternest of those among the Israel's security leadership, who always expect the worst, are forced to admit that the changes of the past year immeasurably improve Israel's situation in the regional power equation.
But reactions in Israel have been limp. The foreign minister released a rather chilly statement - and in the little that has been said, there has been an attempt to minimize the importance of the matter. "It is still too early to celebrate," said a former head of one of Israel's security branches. "The era of threats against Israel has not yet ended," he said, and noted that Algeria has achieved nuclear progress in recent years and that it "is not exactly clear what Saudi Arabia has - there are rumors but there is no solid knowledge, and with respect to Syria there are quite a few question marks" with respect to its unconventional capabilities. According to him, "It is necessary to continue to assume the worst and not the best. Not to mention Iran and Syria, which are allies of Hezbollah and allow it to maintain a balance of threat against Israel in the north of the country."
These comments, by a person who wishes to remain anonymous, are a typical reflection of the doggedly security- minded worldview of decision-makers in Israel, the constant search for enemies and their increasing capabilities - which often serves as an excuse for diplomatic laxity and military toughness. This is demonstrated by two statements that were made recently: Mossad chief Meir Dagan said over a month ago in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that nuclear weapons in Iran are "an existential threat" to Israel. He said this even though it was clear to him that Iran had agreed to suspend its nuclear program and sign the additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz warned Iran again this week, and hinted that Israel might attack if it arms itself with nuclear weapons.
These and other recent remarks testify to the stultified thinking at the official decision-making level and among those who shape Israel's security perceptions. The reality in the region is changing, but they are refusing to recognize this, or minimizing the importance of the change. Such a recognition would force them to draw conclusions that are incongruent with their worldview: that the size of the IDF should be cut and less invested in developing advanced weapons systems. Above all, they would be forced to admit that the only strategic threat to Israel as a democratic country with a stable economy, a high standard of living, social justice and Western values is the conflict with the Palestinians and the rifts that it causes in Israeli society. Libya's dramatic announcement should impel Israel to recognize the fact that the strategic threats "beyond the horizon" have decreased immeasurably and have perhaps even disappeared, whereas the real threats are at its gates here and now.
The rehabilitation of Moussa Koussa
One of the achievements of the Libyan-British-American agreement is in the area of the fight against terror. British and American sources revealed this week that Libya has given the CIA and MI-6 valuable information, including names and other identifying details, about terror organization activists in various places around the world.
According to the British newspaper The Observer, Libya had a sophisticated database on its ties with underground and terror organizations in the Middle East and Africa. Now it is putting at least part of it at the disposal of the United States and Britain.
The architect of this move is Moussa Koussa, the head of Libya's foreign intelligence organization and one of Gadhafi's senior and most trusted advisors. The week before last Koussa met with senior MI-6 officials in one of London's exclusive traditional clubs, the Travelers Club on Pall Mall, and concluded the final details of the agreement.
This secret meeting typifies the paradox and illuminates the surprising personal aspect of relations between Libya and Britain. Until not too long ago, Koussa was one of the Libyans most hated by British intelligence. In June, 1980, he was declared persona non grata and expelled from Britain. Before that, in an interview with The Times, he had threatened that the "revolutionary councils" in Libya would execute British citizens in revenge for Britain's granting asylum to opponents of Gadhafi's regime. Koussa also expressed admiration for the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which had material help from Libya. Later, France accused him of involvement in planning the terror attack on a French passenger plane that was blown up over Niger, in which 170 people were killed. In 1995, a secret report of the British intelligence organization MI-5 stated that Koussa was running networks of Libyan agents in Britain and was "responsible for support for terror organizations all over the world."
